Liquidity and Market Structure by Sanford J. Grossman & Merton H. Miller




Working Paper No. 2641




A paper presented at the Annual Meetings of the American Finance Association.
December 29, 1987 in Chicago, Illinois. Helpful comments on an earlier draft
were received from Kenneth Cone, Kenneth French, T. Eric Kilcollin, Andrei
Shleifer, Lester Telser and Robert Vishny. This research is part of NBER's
research program in Financial Markets and Monetary Economics. Any opinions
expressed are those of the authors not those of the National Bureau of




Marketliquidity is modelled as being determined by the
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coupled with the risk of delayed trade create a demand for
immediacy. Market makers supply immediacy by their continuous
presence, and willingness to bear risk duringthe time period
between the arrival of final buyers and sellers. In the long run
the number of market makers adjusts to equate the supply and
demand for immediacy. This determine the equilibrium level of
liquidity in the market. The lower is the autocorrelation in
rates of return, the higher is the equilibrium level of
liquidity.
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I. Introduction
Keynes once observed that while most of us could surely agree that Queen
Victoria was a happier woman, but a less successful monarch than Queen
Elizabeth I, we would be hard put to restate that notion in precise
mathematical terms. Keynes' observation could apply with equal force to the
notion of market liquidity. The T-bond Futures pit at the Chicago Board of
Trad, is surely more liquid than th. local market for residential housing.
But how much more? Whatisthe decisive difference between them? Is the
colorful open-outcry format of the T-bond Futures market the source of its
great liquidity? Or does the causation run theother way?
Those are some of the issues we propose to consider here. Ourpurpose
is to present a simple model of market structure that captures the essenceof
market liquidity. A key feature of the model is its finer partitioningof
time intervals and of roles for market participants than in standard
treatments of the determination of market prices. Much economic theory,in
the Walrasian tradition, still proceeds as if prices were set in a gigantic
town meeting in which all potential buyers and sellers participatedirectly.
Researchers in the rapidly-growing specialty, sometimes dubbedmarket micro-
structur. theory, have expanded the cast toincludemarket makers in the
sense of intermediaries who can fill gaps arising from imperfect
synchronization between the arrivals of the buyers andthe sellers. The
focus of this literature has been on the inventory management policiesof
market makers (see, e.g., Stoll (1978)) and on their responses tothethreat
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of adverseinformationtrading against them (se. e.g., Glosten and Milgrom
(1985)). Ourintentionhere, however, is not to expand this important and
interesting class of inventory models but to fit these intermediaries and
their temporary inventory holdings into a larger framework that also
encompasses the ultimate demanders and suppliers.
A riaf Overview of the Modal: The Supply and Demand for Immediacy
Our model of market structure has 2 participant groups and we shall
refer to them, for simplicity, as market makers, and outside customers. For
simplicity of exposition only, we shall take their basic tastes, including
risk tolerances, as the same. Their roles are defined at this stage
principally in terms of their initial endowments.
Within the group of outside customers are some who, for any of a variety
of reasons, experience what we call a liquidity event, which leads thea to
perceive a gap at current prices between their desired holdings of a
particular asset and their current holdings of that asset. Even if th. gaps
sum to zero across the whole group, as we assume, some customers might
propose to remedy their portfolio imbalance immediately by undertaking a
transaction in the asset; and for concreteness in exposition, suppose these
potential liquidity traders are net sellers. In our model the putative
sellers can choose to offer the goods immediately to the market makers who
happen to be in the market currently and who have no holdings of the asset,
or at least no imbalance that they too are seeking to eliminate. Or, a
seller can postpone the offer to sell for one stylized period until the
potential buyer customers on the other side of the trade have learned of the
offer and have had a chance to come to the market.4
Clearlythe seller faces a trade-off. By waiting until more potential
buyers havebeennotified,theseller increases the chance of finding an
eagerbuyer. But this delay carries risks; while the buyers are assembling,
the ultimate equilibrium price may shift. The best selling price for a sale
delayedto the second period may be substantially lower (or higher) than the
price in a sale to a market maker in the first period. By selling
immediately, that interim price risk is transferred to the market maker who
then waits until the ultimate buyers have assembled. When we speak ofthe
demandforimmediacy by a seller, we mean the willingness to sell rather than
wait. This demand depends on the volatility of the underlying price and the
diversifiability of the risk of an adverse price move.
The market makers charge for bearing price risk by offering the
immediate sellers a price that is not uncertain, but that is lower, on
average, than the sellers could expect from delaying. The expected price
rise between periods 1 and 2 is. of course, only the market maker's gross
return before allowing for the costs of supplying the service. These include
any direct costs of effecting and monitoring trades,but also the important,
though often overlooked cost of being available and open for business when
th. outside customers arrive to trade. These opportunity costs of
maintaining a continuous presence in the market, which we mode], as fixed
costs, play a key role in determining the SUOD1Y of immediacy and market
making services.
The market makers, as emphasized earlier, mustalsoassume the price
risk that the immediacy demanders shed. That the aggregate price risk is
merely shifted to the market makers does not, however, rule out efficiency
gainsfrom thearrangement. Inour model, where all participants have the5
same risk tolerance, the gains arise essentially from diversification.-ths
spreading of th. transferred risks over the entire group of market makers.
The larger chat group, the lower. ceteris oaribus the risk and expected
return per unit traded by each and hence also the lower the effective cost of
immediacy to the customers. The number of market makers will, adjust until,
in equilibrium, the returns to each from assuming the risk of waiting to
trade with the ultimate buyers just balance the Costs of maintaining a
continuous presence in the market. This adjustment determines the
equilibrium amount 'of immediacy provided, i.e., the amount by which price is
temporarily depressed by a typical sell order.
Our model thus suggests looking to differences in the cost to market
makers of maintaining a market presence and to differences in the demand by
customers for immediacy for the keys to market structureandmarket
liquidity. The greater the demand for immediacy and the lower the cost to
market makers of maintaining a continuous presence, the larger the proportion
of the transactions between ultimate customers effected initially through
market makers, and hence the more liquid the market.
The Liquidity Soectrum in Real World Market Structures
Successful futures markets ar. the leading examples of markets where the
demand for immediacy is high. Futures markets are successful precisely for
those commodities and in those time periods when price volatility, and hence
the risks of delaying trading are high. The price risks of volatility ar.
further reinforced for potential hedger Customers in those markets by the
high leverage and extreme und.r.divsrsificatiofl of the underlying spot
inventory positions that constitute their main line of business. Immediacy
also becomes of particular concern where, as is frequently the case, the6
futurse transaction is merely one leg of an inter-contract or inter.market
hedge. Little or no risk may be incurred once all the components of the
hedge have been put in place: but much risk is incurred when only some of the
legs have been set. When the transactor is naked," to use the colorful
language of the trade, the delay of avert a few seconds can become critical.
(See, e.g., Grossman and Miller (l9B6b).)
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Thedemand for immediacy in successful futures markets is not only
urgent, but sustained. The regular seasonal build up and build down of
inventories as commodities move through the production chain creates a
continual desire to trade, not just to b2]. futures. In financial futures
markets, dealers' inventories of the underlying securities build up and down
in respons. to periodic auctions of U.S. Treasury issues, to the flotation of
stocks or bonds by corporations or to the restructuring of portfolios by
large institutional investors.
The sustained demand for hedging and hence for trading futures quickly
is often accommodated by designating a specific physical market place or
exchange in which many competing market makers can offer their services
simultaneously. Such arrangements help spread the fixed costs to market
makers of maintaining a presence, as does the practice at most present-day
futures exchanges of providing trading areas for many different contracts
between which individual market makers can drift as trading interest changes.
Many, but not all, futures exchanges also permit market makers to serveboth
as brokers for customers and astraderson personal account, though not, of
course, on the same transaction. Moet floor traders tend to specializein
one role or the other, but the freedom to switch roles can permit a quick7
adjustment in the number of market makers when the flow of orders changes
abruptly.
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At the opposite extreme from the highly liquid futures markets where
intermediary market makers participate as principals in virtually all
transactions, stand the highly illiquid markets, such as those for
residential housing, where virtually non. of the transactions passes through
a dealer's temporary inventory.2 Sellers of individual homes are typically
less concerned with short-term price volatility, and hence with immediacy,
than with making sure that the widest possible set of ultimate buyers can be
informed of the house's availability. Potential market makers, moreover,
face not only all the ordinary costs of maintaining a continuous presence in
a thin market, but the additional moral hazards that arise from the owner's
possibly adverse private information about the value of the property. The
result is a market in which intermediaries, to the extent that they are
involved at all, provide brokerage or search services, not immediacy.
The Structure of the Stock Mprke;
Most real-world markets lie somewhere between these liquidity extremes
and their structures will typically mix features from both the search markets
and the liquidity markets. U.S. stock market institutions, for example,
'For a discussion of the benefits and the supposed abuses of dual
trading on futures exchanges, see Grossman and Miller (l986b).
2Although the fraction of potential trades executed immediately by
market makers rather than d.lay.d for search is higher for futures exchanges
than in virtually any other market setting, search plays a role even there.
A cas, in point is so-called sunshin. trading in which pending large
and presumably informationless orders by portfolio insurers are publicized in
advanc, throughout the investment counLty with a view to attracting a large
inflow of counterpartias prepared to tak. th. other side. Whether such
sunshine trading violates long-standing regulatory prohibitions against
pr.arranged trading" is a policy issu. currently muchindispute.8
currently involv, at least four distinct forms of market organization
operating simultaneously, but in different segments of th. market and with
somewhat different immediacy clienteles:
1..For a few of the most widely held and heavily traded securities,
such as IBfl or AT&T. the market at the New York Stock Exchange often
approximates th. open-outcry pits at the commodity exchanges. These are
stocks in which the minute to minute order flow is highly variable relative
to the arrival of news about the underlying valu, of the shares, and for
which our model predicts a large number of market makers in equilibrium. The
"crowd for those stocks, though substantially smaller than in the T.bond
futures market, is large enough to offer a competitive discipline to the
Exchange's tranchised "specialist, who, in these particularly active
markets, typically plays more the rol. of an auctioneer (and a commission
collector) than a market maker on personal account.
2. The specialist's role as a market maker assumes greater prominence
for the hundreds of smaller, less active stocks, some of which may not even
trade as frequently as once a day. In such stocks, our model would not
predict an equilibrium with many market makers. The designation of a
specialist by the Exchange. however, does at least guarantee that someone
will indeed be maintaining a physical presence in the market, ready to effect
a transaction should an order happen to arrive. The potential for abuse of
the specialist's monopoly position is mitigated by the same standard cross-
subsidization approach long familiar in U.S. public utility regulation. As a
condition for keeping the franchise, specialists on the New York Stock
Exchange, for example, are encouraged by the Exchange to limit price changes
between successive transactions to no more than one tick (normally 12 1/29
cents per share), using personal inventory to absorb arty temporary imbalances
along the way. This restriction, which is in fact monitored by the Exchange,
serves both to limit specialists' profit and to create the appearance of
liquidity, though, in practice only for very small transactions. Should a
very large order arrive, however, and should it be larger than can be
absorbed by the specialist or by any previously entered limit orders then
resting in the specialist's "book, th. market can switch to search mode.
Th. specialist, with the permission of the Exchange, can suspend trading in
the stock and institute a search for courtterparties to the imbalance, either
elsewhere on the floor of the Exchange or, more likely these days, off the
floor at the block-trading desks of the investment bankers.
3. These desks are the third, and increasingly the dominant form of
market organization for trading common stocks in the U.S., thanks to the
concentration of so much corporate stock in a relatively small number of
extremely large pension funds, mutual funds and other institutional holders.
Because relatively small portfolio adjustments by these institutional holders
would be far too large to be absorbed by any specialist firm, the large
blocks of single stocks, or sometimes whol, portfolios are brought to the
upscairs sarket maintained by the investment banking firms. Until recently
at least, th. upstairs desks functioned primarily asa searchmarket. The
upstairs traders essentially shopped the bl.ock among their customers, and
wh.n asuitablecounterparty had been located, and a deal struck, reported
th. trade to the relevant sp.cialiats on th. floor of the Exchange. In the
process, they picked up on behalf of thsinitiatingside any limit orders on
the specialist's book that were transformed into market orders by the price
change occasioned by the block trade.10
Although search was the initial, and still remains the major function of
the upstairs market, the amountof"positioning" and henc.ofmarket-making
liquidity, provided by the upstairs firms has increased substantially in
recent years. The shift ::aces mainly to the highly liquid futures and
options index markets which permit the upstairs firms to hedge their
inventories while conducting the search for or waiting for the other side of
the transaction.
4. Finally, at th. other end of the spectrum from the upstairs,
wholesale broker-dealer market lies the retail, dealer market in Over-the-
Counter stocks, for which, with a few well-known exceptions, the normal
trading interest is typically too small to justify listing even on a regional
exchange) The market for such stocks is not a physical exchange floor but a
set of computer terminals. When introduced originally in the 1970's, the
computerized NASDAQ market system for OTC stocks offered essentially only a
bu1letin board in which those market makers with access to the system could
enter price quotes. The quotes, though deemed firm for some standard,
minimum size trade were essentially advertisements and the actual
transactions were not executed automatically, but negotiated between the
parties. The market makers in particular stocks, although they did position
1Soma corporations of substantial size, however, may nevertheless choose
to list in this market because there are fewer restrictions ott size and
capital structure (such as a one-share, one-vote rule) than on the NYSE or
A(!1.U
small inventories, assumed no obligation to maintain a continuous presence or
to smooth price changes between successivetransactions.'
All four forms of market organization for trading common stocks, along
with those of the index futures and options markets, were subjected in
October 1987 to what seemed to be liquidity events, in our sense, of
unprecedented magnitude. We shall return briefly to those events in Section
lit. First, however, we turn in Section II to set down the detailed
structure of our model of market liquidity and a characterization of its
equilibrium.
II. A Formal Model of Market Liquidity
In this section we present a formal model of the role of market makers
in providing immediacy. We focus most of our attention on the consequences
of a temporary order imbalance of size i in a simple world with only three
dates: 1, 2, and 3. At date I a liquidity event occurs which creates a
temporary order imbalance of size i. Market makers offset this temporary
imbalance by taking trading positions which they hold until date 2. We
denot. the nonmarket makers by the term "outside customer" although, in
practice, of course, individuals and firms can play either role at different
times. By a temporary order imbalance we mean an asynchronization of outside
tIn addition to the four markets so far listed, there may now be as many
as six distinct stock markets if one counts the "after-hours" market (which
now includes th. trading of big-name U.S. stocks on foreign exchanges) and
th. so-called "fourth marker" in which larg. pension funds, especially those
following "passive" or indexing serarsgiee, transfer baskets of stocks
directly to and from each other in essentially inforisationless trades. The
futures and options markets in stocks, of course, constitute still another
form of stock market at least for the trading if not the holding of stocks.
Many European stock markets, where the volumes of trading are still
quite small by U.S. standards, us. "batch" or "periodic caLl" systems rather
than any of the continuous trading systems we find hers. For a comprehensive
survey of trading practices overseas, sac Whitcomb (1985).12
customer trading times; the net trading demand would be zero at the current
price if all traders were simultaneously present in the market.
At dat. 2, the market makers offset their positions as other outside
customers arrive to offset the imbalance. Thus, the length of time between
date 1. and date 2 is the period of time needed for enough orders of outside
customers to arrive at the market to offset the initial order imbalance.
Date 3 is introduced only as a terminal condition for valuing the securities
as of date2.1
We assum, twoassets:a risk-free asset called cash (with zero rate of
return), and a risky asset. LetP3
be the exogenously given terminalprice
(or liquidation value) of the risky asset. Assume that public information
about arrives before trade at period I and also before trade at period
2. Let be the number of units of the asset owned by an outside customer
after trade at time t,andlet be that customer's holdings of cash (in
dollars). Two interpretations can be given to i.Inthe first, the
outside customer is a commercial hedger and the asset is a futures contract.
In this case, the hedger's net holding at period 3 is x3 —+ i,where
is the number of units of the spot commodity (which may. of course, be a
security) owned by the hedger. The hedger's terminal wealth is then
(1) W3=32+P3i3—82+P3x2+iP3.
The hedger is using the futures market to offset the spot price P.riskof
the initial position. (Note that under this futures market interpretation.
the asset is in zero supply.)
'The reader is referred to Ho (1984) for a model of equilibrium market
making in a continuous-time, poisson-arrival-of-orders setting.13
In the second interpretation, the market is a stock market, and the
outsidecustomer at time 1 has an endowmentof size i in the security,
which is inappropriate in the light of the customer's risk preferences and
information on the risk-return pattern associated withthesecurity. In this
case, x3 is th. final holding of the security at the terminal date, and c3
—
x2.In contrast to the futures market interpretation, the asset is not in
zero supply; and if i is correlated across customers, then the aggregate
endowment of the asset relevant for market clearing at each date t will,be
affectedby i.
Undereither interpretation we assume that at times t —1,2 the
customer chooses asset holdings ,andarisk-free asset positiot B to














whir.t1represents the initial endowment of the asset and V0 represents
oth.r wealth, Not. that:
—0and i3— *2+iinthefutures market case;
—iand *3 —*2
in the stock market case.





represents the excess demand for the asset, whether it be a
futures contract or a stock. Therefore, it simplifies matters to define a
trader's excess demand to be
e—l,2.
In the above notation customers choose their positions to maximize
(3) EU(W3)
— + + (3
-22
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Wewillassume that P is normally distributed at each date,andthat
(4) U(W) —
-aW
Bybackward induction, and (4), if we let xr denote the optimal value of








Using the exponential utility function, the optimal value for x2 is
CdE2P3 -
(5) x2 — - i
a Var2 P3
wher. all means and variances areconditionedon the information at time 2.
Note thatthecustomers excess demand is
edwhich is linear in i.
Hence, if all. customers are identical, except possibly with respect to i,
we can take xr to represent the aggregate demand of customers, and i to
be the aggregate potential imbalance.
We assume that there are M other traders in the market who do not hold
the spot commodity and thus face no spot price risk; these are the market
makers. (Under the stock market interpretation, assume that themarket
makers do not hold an endowment of the security prior to their date 115
trading with outside customers.) Market makers have the same utility
function, but for them i —0.Hence, if th. excess demand per market maker
is x the total excess demand by market makers in period 2is
d_____ (6) Mx —M
2
a Var2 P3
W. now state the assumption critical to understanding the benefits of
waiting from period I to period 2 to trade. In particular, it is that
asvnchronizatiofl of desired trades creates the demand for immediacy at time
1.Thus,thepositive immediacy demand felt by the customers at tias 1 is.
by definition, offset by customers arriving at dat. 2 with th. opposite





Market clearing at date 2 requires that the excess demand of (a)
customers who arrived at date1,plus (b) market makers, plus (c) th. new
customers arriving at date 2 should sum to zero:
E23 -P2
(E.P1 •P )E2P3 -
(7) -i+M
2______+i—o.
a Var2 3 aVar2P3 aVar2 P3
Not. that in a futures interpretation, the right-hand side represents an
aggregat. endowment of zero, whil. in astockmarket (7) means that excess
demands(i.e..trades net of endowments) mustsumto zero. Note also that




The equilibrium excess demand at dat.2of the customer arriving at the
market at date 1.is thus
(9) x —-i
Using (3), (4), (8), and (9) we can find the dateIdemand of the
customer from





This problem hasthesameformastheproblem in period 2 except that the
risk from the point of view of period I is that — isnot known.
As before, the customer's excess demand function is
£ -P
(11) cd_ 13 1
a Var1(E23)
where the law of iterated expectations is used to obtain E1E23 —E1P3.
Market Makers and the Provision of tediacv
At date 1. there are M market makers. They constantly watch the
floor of the exchange either directly or through their agents on the floor.
They solve the same maximization problem as the customers except that for
them i —0.Hence their excess demand function is
E -P a 1.3 1.
(12) x —
1.a Var1(E2P3)
Market clearing at date 1thusrequires
a cd
(13) M.x1+x1 —o
Using(11) and (12), it is seen that (13) becomes:17
E13-P1___ (14) —
aVar1(E2P3)
Let — -1,be the excess return earned by the market makers.
Then
Ph
(15) E1 — + a Var1()
Thus if H is finite, a positive value of P1i (which causes hedgers to
desire to "shorts) will induce a temporary fall in the market price. Note
that vs have defined the order imbalance to sum to zero across periods I
and 2. In particular, no aggregate risk is associated with holding the
asset across periods. Therefore, in the absence of an asynchronization of
order flows, —0.It is the asynchronization of these flows and the
finite risk bearing capacity of market makers that leads to deviate
from 0. Note that from (12) and (14) the value of the positions held by a





The larger is this inventory the higher the expected return between period
I.
and 2 to compansat. the market maker for th. risk that new information may
arrive (causing E2P3 —0 P1)leading to capital losses on the inventory
positions.
Determination of the Number of Market Makers
Amarket maker choosing always to have a presence on the trading floor
is aasua.d to forego opportunities elsewhere worth Sc. The gain from being
on th. floor is the ability to trade at price P1. Then the expected utility
of a market maker who pays Sc out of initial wealth is1.8
EU(W0
-+ -
wherethe profit between period 2 and period 3. ( -P2)x,does not
appear because (6) and (8) imply that x —0.
Free entry of market makers will occur until
(1.6) EU(W0 -c+ - P1)x)—
EU(W0)
Equation(12) and the exponential utility assumption can be used to evaluate
(16):




(17b) eac £ exp( -z)—I ,where
2'r1P2 2___ t—a Van z —
(1+N)2
Var i







Ifwe assume that the expectation of an order imbalance is zero, i.e..










isdeterminedsolaly by ac and is an increasing function of ac. The lower
th. cost of maintaining a market presence, the greater the number of market
makers in equilibrium. That number would also be larger, of course, the
smaller th. risk-aversion parameter a for the market makers.
Var i is th. average size of hedging demand (since hedging demand in
its average size is Elil which is proportional to Var i when Iis
normally distributed). Var12 is the predictability of the price change.
Hence, as either of these twovariancesrises the number of market makers
rises.
Some Empirical Imolications of the Model
The contribution of market makers shows up in the correlation between
successive price changes. Since the model is only a 3-period model with a








Using (16), the fact that P2 —E23,E01 —E0P2and E12 —13yields







To impart a tiaal.ss quality to the uncertainty, assume that one-step-ahead










Wecan now restate q;20
C
(23)
Thus, from (19) the correlation between successive price changes is negative
and is determined solely by the cost of being a market maker c.







Hence, for a given c, since r is fixed, assets with more variability of
expected price changes will have higher negative covariance.
Finally, consider the amountofimmediacy provided in equilibrium. This
can be measured by the amount of customer trade that is completed in period
cd cd cd








(25b) x2 •x1 1+H
Since the total size of the trade desired is -i, the fraction completed in
period 1 is determined by M. Jhen H is very large the transaction is
completed immediately and the market can be said to be liquid..
III. Extensions and Ammlications
Many readers will have been surprised to have come so far in a paper on
market liquidity with no referenc. to the term bid-ask apr.ad. That term
hasindeed dominated academic discussions of transaction costs and market
efficiency ever since thepioneeringpaper by Demsetz (1968); and, even
before that, the term was the stand.ard, short-hand among practitioners for
contrasting the cost of trading between markets and over time. For all its21
familiarity, however, and its rough common sens, as a metric, we believ, it
doesnotfully capture th. notion of market liquidity.
Limitations of the bid-askspreadas ameasure ofliquidity
First (as Stoll (1976), (l98) has emphasized), the bid-ask spread
measures exactly the market maker's return for providing immediacy only in
the special case in which the market maker simultaneously "crosses (i.e.,
executes both sides of) the trade, one at the bid and the other at the ask.
But in that case, of course, the spread could not also serve as a valid
measure of the Cost of supplying immediacy to each of the customers. It is
simply a charge by the market maker for executing their orders, rather than
for providing them liquidity services.
In th. more typical cas, that our model was designed to portray, the
orders do not arrive simultaneously but are randomly separated in time. If
so, the price may change between the time at which ch. market maker buys and
sells; and the market maker may earn much more or less than the spread quoted
t the time of the first leg of the transaction. And, for the same reason,
the currently quoted spread cannot serve any transactor as a precise measure
of the cost of trading imm.diately rather than delaying ch. order,
particularly when the order is a large one. Yet that cost, as we have
emphasized, is the •ssence of market liquidity. A customer desiring to sell
is likely to be more concerned with how th. bid will chang. over time than
with the size of the current bid-ask spread.
The benefit of iediacy to a customer is the shedding of the price risk
associated with waiting. In most real-world exchanges this waiting can also
be achieved by means of a limit order to sell, for example, at th. current
quoted bid price. Such a limit order will be executed if and when a buyer22
willing to pay this price appears and no other seller is offering to sell at
a lower price. Sut that may never occur and the customer may have to revise
the order and sell at a a price lower than the bid price at the time the
first limit order was sent in. Thus, if lucky, the limit-order customer gets
apricehigher than the bid, while if unlucky, a low-r price. The customer's
choice between limit orders and market orders is thus governed not by the
bid-ask spread, but precisely by those considerations which our model
suggests determine the supply and demand for immediacy, i.e., by the
likelihood that a buyer will arrive who is willing to pay more than the
current bid. (See Cohen, et al. (1981), for an equilibrium analysis of bid-
ask spreads which emphasizes the importance of jumps in the price away from
the current quotes.)
Not. also that a substantial volum, of transactions occur within the
prevailing quoted bid-ask Spread becausethetraders who commit to a bid (or
ask) are giving the market an option. Some traders may decide not to commit
to buying or selling at particular prices and thus the quoted bid may be
lower than the actual bids which appear in response to a market sell order.
The more that market orders to buy and sell are separated in time the
greater the exposure of the maiket maker to the risks of adverse information
trading. The bid-ask spread, in addition to the pure timing option premium,
will then contain still another component, which compensates the market
makers on their information-less trades for their likely losses to the
informedtraders. This phenomenon, asnotedearlier, has been much studied
in th. academic literature on market micro structure. (See, e.g., Clost.n
andMilgro.(1985).) Much less attention, however,has beendirected to the
inverseproblem of whatis likelyto happen to conventional quoted bid-ask23
spread.s in highly active markets, like futures markets, where many separate
buy and sell orders are entering the trading pit virtually simultaneously.
Because the adverse selection problem arises only when a market maker cannot
hope to offset a position immediately, and because the costs of maintaining a
market presence are mainly (and, in our model, entirely) fixed costs, it
mightseemthat quoted bid-ask spreads and market makers' profits from what
amounts to crossing trades would be driven towards zero by the competitive
entry of new marketmakers.1 Where th. fixed costs are large relative to the
entry-inhibiting trading risks, a competitive market may not be viable
because the market makers would have no way of recovering their fixed costs
of maintaining a presence on the floor.2 To keep markets viable, therefore,
exchanges may limit the number of "seats available to market makers (or
designate a regulated specialist).
Exchanges also typically define a minimum price change unit (called a
'tick) which, in highly active markets, serves also to set a minimum on both
th. quoted bid-ask spread and the profits a "scalper makes from a quick
naround. This somewhat subtle and frequently overlooked role of the
minimum tick helps explain, among other things, the seeming paradox of
finding many traders in an obviously highly competitive pit fighting
(sometimes literally) to execute an order. This behavior suggests chat the
quoted bid-ask spread of one tick, and hence the profit from a quick turn on
tReaember that in our model, market makers take risky positions as well
as match orders. Entry occu.s to the point where the market makers earn a
return on their risky positions plus any profits from simultaneous matching
which just balances the trading risks and the fixed costs of maintaining a
continuous presence.
terms of the notation in our model, the non-viability of a
competitive equilibrium would occur when c becomes large relative to a.24
a standard siz. trade is actually higher in an active market than it would be
in the absence of the minimum tick rule. Part of the art of managing a
futures exchange is finding a minimum tick siz. for its contracts, high
enough to sustain a viably competitive supply of floor traders, but not so
high as to give rise to the problems of rationing and queue discipline so
oftenencounteredunder price controls.1
L.i.itations of the "Liquidity Ratio"
ppaMeasure of Market Liauiditv
Another widely used empirical measurein inter-marketcomparisons of
market liquidity is the "liquidity ratio." defined astheratio of average
dollar volume of trading to the average price change during some interval.
(See, e.g., Dubofsky and Groth (1984). Cooper, Croth and Avers (1983), Reilly
and Wong (1982) and Martin (1975).) A high value for the ratio is taken to
indicate that many shares were traded with little price change; and a low
value to suggest that a trader bringing alarge blockto market will induce a
large adverse price change.
These measures, of course, tell us at best only about past average
associations between price changesand volume.They do not answerthe
critical question of how the sudden arrival of alarger-than-averageorder
would affect price. Nor do they distinguish adequately among the sources of
pricevolatility. A particular market may displayhigh price variability not
because it is illiquid but because new fundam.ntal information arrives
closely related but somewhat different problem is faced by the
designers of computerized, automatic execution systems like the much-
publicized (but little used) INTEX•xchang.in Bermuda. Because th. users
can hit directly any bids or offers shoving on the screen, no intermediary
can hope to earn a living by "scalping" the bid-ask spread on quick trades.
Thiskeeps market makers, who might otherwis,provideimmediacy when orders
donot match, from being able torecover their opportunitycosts of
maintaininga continuous presence in the market.25
frequently. High price volatility can occur without highvolumes of trading;
in fact, when the import of the news is unambiguous, there may be no trading
at all.
The liquidity ratio, in sum, fails to capture what we have called the
immediacy that the market's structure offers. At best, and with all, due
regard for the pitfalls of estimating simultaneous equations, it might hope
to measure the average elasticity of the market's demand curve for
transactions. What we need, however, is a measure of how well the market
makers are providing customers with an effective substitute for the delays in
a search for a more inclusive set of counterparties. Whether so complex a
notion can ever be distilled down to a single scalar is still far from clear.
Our equations (24) and (25) (a) and (b) with their focus on reversals offer
some promising new leads (similar in spirit to those op.ned earlier by Roll
(1984)), which we hope to follow up in future empirical research.
The need for new ways of measuring and comparing the liquidity of
different market structures takes on added urgency in the light of the
dramatic stock-market events of last October and especially of the many
policy proposals for market reform that have surfaced in the wake of the
crash and are now being actively debated in the press and in Congress. But
even in the absenc. of numerical calibrations of liquidity we believe that
the model of market liquidity presented in the previous section can offer a
helpful perspective on th. main events of those hectic days.
Market Liauiditv and the Crash of October 1987
We hasten to add that our interpretation of the recent crash in terms of
our modal of market liquidity must not be taken as signifying our belief that
the event was entirely, or even primarily, a matter of liquidity rather than
of fundamentals. (See Miller, et p1.(1987) fora discussion of the events26
preceding and surrounding the crash.) Whatever the precipitating cause, a
massive liquidity event, in our earlier sense of an imbalance in the demand
for immediacy clearly occurred at the opening of the markets on the 19th.
80th the futures market and the cash spot market were hit simultaneously with
a flood of sell orders of unprecedented size.
Each of the two markets responded immediately to the imbalances, but in
ways appropriate to their characteristic and, as we had noted earlier, quite
different structures. The rules of the NYSE permit. -indeed,encourage- -
specialiststo delay the opening of trading when the overnight accumulation
of orders for a particular stock is too far out of balance to allow market
clearing at a price near the previous close. The delayed opening gives the
specialist time to search the floor and the upstairs block-trading desks for
balancing orders on the other side. Under ordinary conditions, when most
other stocks have opened and are trading normally, that search is completed
successfully, and trading resumed (though, typically, with a somewhat larger
than usual price gap) in a matter of a few minutes. At the opening of the
19th, however, the order imbalances were so widespread and so large that no
immediate help from on or off the floor was available to the beleaguered
specialists of many of the most heavily traded shares. An hour after the
opening bell, more than a third of the stocks in the Dow-Jones Index
(including such widely-followed international companies as IRK, Sears and
Exxon) had yet to start trading.
By contrast, the S6IP 500 futures market at the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange, lik, other futures markets, seeks to provid, a setting in which
prices can best speedily reflect the best current information. If theoutcry
at the opening call on a futures exchange shows the ov.rnigttaccumulationof
orders to be heavily unbalanced, then the price will jumpdirectlyto a level27
at which trading can imisediately takeplace.1 Th. previous closing price
plays no explicit role in setting that level or the path to reach it. This
contrast in opening procedures between the futures and the stock markets is
fully understandable in th. light of our model. The high risk associated
with futures trading (recall pages 4-6 above) causes those markets to be
organized precisely to provide maximal iediacy of order execution. The
costs of delayed execution being normally less for stock trading, the market
makers there seek to provide more search service relative to immediacy than
in the futures markets.
On Monday the 19th, opening prices in New York had to fall some 10
percent below the Friday close- -an enormous gap by past standards--before
trading in all stocks could begin.2 By 11:00 A.M. or so, New York time,
however, all the major delayed-opening stocks had resumed trading, and the
two markets were now virtually back in step. Although the pric, fall had been
large, the two markets, from all outward appearances appeared to have handled
successfully the enormous imbalance of sell, orders that had accumulated at
e opening. But the capital resources of their regular market makers on or
around the floor had by then been heavily coitted. In Chicago, many of
the smaller market makers had left the floor, either voluntarily or under
The Chicago Board of Options Exchange opens with an auctioneer
establishing provisional opening pric.s for each traded option. But with so
many separate maturities and striking prices involved, the process of finding
simultaneous, viabl, trading ranges is far from easy when prices are moving
rapidly. On the morning of the 19th, and again on the 20th, by the tim. the
rotation, as the opening process is called, had worked its way around to
the last series, the earlier, tentatively-established trading ranges had
become hopelessly wide of the mark. The process had to be repeated and on
Tuesday trading did not in fact begin until far after the regular opening time.
2This difference in opening procedures in the two markets undoubtedly
contributed to the widespread (but misleading) impression at the time that
the futures market in Chicago. if not actually dragging down stock prices in
New York, was at least signalling to an already panicky public that heavy new
s.lling pressure was on its way to th. market in New York.28
pressure from their clearing firms. Those that remainedwereunwilling to
take on large positions in such a volatile market except at price concessions
far larger than normal. IThen a further wave of sellordershit both markets
somewhat after noon, New York time, there was less resistance from the market
makers and the fabled"meltdown wassoon under way. Or, tousethe less
colorfullanguage of our model, both markets had by then become highly
illiquid and virtually incapable of supplying immediacy at the low cost their
users in the past had come to expect.
That illiquidity was evidenced in the spot market by (1) the virtual
impossibility of executing market sell orders at the bid quoted at the time
of order entry, and (2) the delays in executing and confirming trades on
Monday afternoon and again, after theopeningon Tuesday. On the futures
exchange, order flows that might have moved the market by at most a tick or
twointhe weekbefore,were moving the market by 10 or 20 times that amount
ormore in the early afternoon of Tuesday, October 20. Despite the evident
rise in the cost of immediacy to sellers, the inflow of sell orders
continued, and perhaps even accelerated in what took on all the appearances
of a classic, self-reinforcing panic. By early afternoon on Tuesday, trading
had been suspended in many NYSE stocks and in the main options and futures
markets. With virtually no market-making capacity remaining, the burden of
equilibration had to be assumed by the search for buyers off the market,
culminating in th. cavalry-like ride to the rescue on Tuesday afternoon by
large U.S. corporations instituting buy-back programs of their ownshares.
11n the case of the NASDAQ bulletin board, market prices were sometimes
changing at a faster rate than the quotes were being updated. When the best
offer to sell is entered below the best bid to buy, a market is deemed
crossed and under the then standing NASDAQ rules only thebidshowed on the
screen. No further transactions could be made untiltheobsolete bid was
updated which often involved substantial delay.29
Atthesame time, the Fed.ral Reserve System was directly and indirectly
encouraging banks to support dealer inventory positions. Bythe end of the
day,theseinfusions of buying power had pushed prices nearly back to their
l.v.ls before the Monday noon collapse and substantial market-making capacity
was back in place.
Effective market-making capacity in the period immediately after the
crash, however, as well as at several critical Junctures during the crash,
was reduced by restrictions iapo5ed on programtradingwhich cut the normal
arbitrage linkage between the market makers in the spot and futures markets.
Arbitragers. by taking offsetting positions in both markets close to
simultaneously. can transmit some of the pressure of order imbalances from
the market first impacted to the market makers in the other. Market makers'
resources in both markets can thus be brought to bear on the initiating
imbalance more effectively, much as they would be if the number of active
market makers had been increased. Price concessions and hence the cost of
transacting can be kept smaller in both markets, thanks to arbitrage program
trading, than might otherwise be thecase) How ironic then to find
arbitrage program trading still so often blamed for undermining investor
confidence in the market.
iFor a further discussion of arbitrage program trading and especially
its interaction with portfolio insurance, see Grossman (1988).30
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